- Russia deployed subsea vessels to gather intelligence on subsea cables
- The vessels were tracked by the UK Navy and Airforce
- The operation signals the wider threats to subsea cables in areas of active military conflict
A Russian submarine operation potentially targeting critical undersea cables has been thwarted by the UK, the nation’s government has claimed..
British personnel, ships and aircraft monitored a Russian submarine as it slipped from its harbor and headed towards British waters.
The submarine was quickly identified as a ruse to distract from the deployment of undersea naval units based at Olenya Guba in Russia headed directly for critical undersea infrastructure.
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UK pushes Russian operation from covert to overt
In order to signal to Russia that their covert operations had been discovered, the UK deployed Type 23 frigate HMS St Albans, RFA Tidespring and Merlin helicopters, and an RAF P8 submarine hunting aircraft to track the Russian Akula-class submarine and its sub-surface acquaintances.
The additional sub-surface deployments were made by Russia’s Main Directorate of Deep Sea Research (known as GUGI), which specializes in monitoring offshore and deep sea infrastructure such as sub-sea cables, windfarms and pipelines.
GUGI is known to handle surface vessels disguised as research vessels that conduct intelligence gathering operations, as well as a fleet of small vessels capable of submerging to extreme depths, alongside vehicles capable of remote and autonomous operation.
Upon being alerted to the presence of the UK’s tracking, both the Akula-class submarine and deployments made by GUGI headed back to Russian waters.
The UK government theorizes that the vessels deployed by GUGI likely intended to survey subsea fiber optic cables, potentially gathering intelligence on the locations of certain cables that can be sabotaged should tensions between Russia and the West heat up.
UK Defense Secretary John Healey MP issued a direct warning to Russian President Vladimir Putin, stating, “We see you, we see your activity over our underwater infrastructure. You should know that any attempt to damage it will not be tolerated and would have serious consequences.”
What other subsea cables are at risk?
Russian operations around subsea cables in the North Sea raise the wider question of how protected other subsea cables are – especially in regions experiencing military activity.
Multiple subsea cables currently span the Strait of Hormuz for example, including projects such as the Gulf Bridge International Cable System/Middle East North Africa Cable System (GBICS/MENA), FALCON, 2Africa, Asia Africa Europe-1 (AAE-1), Fibre In Gulf (FIG), and SeaMeWe-6.
Numerous other projects looking to connect countries in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf with subsea cables have been delayed or cancelled, including the Pearls section of Meta’s 2Africa project.
Over 99% of international data traffic travels via subsea fiber optic cables, making them a prime target for sabotage by nations such as Iran, as well as its proxies within the Middle East.
Specialized vehicles aren’t required to sabotage sub-sea cables, as certain civilian vessels alleged to be a part of Russia’s hybrid war have demonstrated through the use of anchor-dragging attacks, most recently against a cable linking Helsinki to Estonia via the Gulf of Finland.
The recently announced blockade of Iranian ports in the Strait of Hormuz by the US should bolster protections against potential subsea cable attacks in the region, as vessels docked and departing from Iranian ports will likely be closely monitored 24/7 for the foreseeable future, or until the conflict ends.
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benedict.collins@futurenet.com (Benedict Collins)
